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DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 18/05/2006 Accident number: 178 
Accident time: 09:00 Accident Date: 14/03/1996 




Primary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Class: Excavation accident Date of main report: 17/03/1996 
ID original source: LK (date inferred) Name of source: HT (field) 
Organisation: Name removed  
Mine/device: PMN AP blast Ground condition: agricultural (recent) 
residential/urban 
Date record created: 14/02/2004 Date  last modified: 18/05/2006 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system:  Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale: not recorded Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
no independent investigation available (?) 
squatting/kneeling to excavate (?) 
visor not worn or worn raised (?) 
 
Accident report 
At the time of the accident the demining group were using two-man teams and a one-man 
drill. In this, one deminer used the detector, searched for tripwires, cut undergrowth and 
excavated finds while his partner watched from a distance and "controlled" him. The demining 
group issued frontal protection and their drills assumed the deminer would kneel or squat 
while excavating. 
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An internal investigation was carried out on 16th March 1996 by an expatriate. The undated 
report was made available by the demining group's country manager. The following 
summarises its content. 
The mined area was a village, recently repopulated by returning refugees, parts of which had 
been heavily mined by the Vietnamese in 1982. The demining platoon started clearance 
operations on 6th January 1996 and had been finding an average of three PMNs per day. 
At approximately 09:00 the victim detonated a PMN while investigating a detector signal with 
his prodder. He sustained a traumatic amputation of his left thumb and forefinger, grazing to 
his left upper arm and to the lower half of his face, and "a slight laceration to the cornea of his 
left eye" that caused 50% blindness in this eye. He was also bleeding from both ears. The 
victim was wearing body armour and a visor. 
After receiving first aid he was taken to a hospital at Taphaya, Thailand about 8km away, and 
then to Aranyaprathet Hospital, Thailand. His hand could not be saved and was amputated at 
Aranyaprathet. His eyesight and his hearing on his left side gradually improved. 
The investigators stated that the victim "was investigating a signal situated to the left side of 
his clearing lane. The signal could be heard when the locator was passed one head's width to 
the side of the one meter lane but the mine was about 15cm beyond that. The total distance 
from the left side of the lane is about 30cm". The victim had been investigating this signal for 
two minutes before the mine detonated, but did not know that it was a mine as he could 
neither see nor feel it.  
"All injuries were sustained on the left side of the deminer only so it is unlikely that he had 
turned properly (contrary to the Section Commander's statement) to investigate the signal 
which would tend to suggest he didn't take the investigation seriously and thus prodded into 
the mine". [The parentheses are in the original.] 
The chest protector performed well but the visor "shattered completely on impact with the 
shock wave and debris from the mine. After the accident only two large pieces from the top 
half of the visor could be recovered as the lower half disintegrated". 
Statements were taken from the victim and the Section Commander, who was acting as the 
deminer's partner at the time. Full copies were not included in the report. 
 
Conclusion 
The internal investigators concluded that the accident was not avoidable. They thought that 
the mine was probably initiated by the prodder touching the pressure pad and that it was 




The internal investigators found that no changes in SOP were required but recommended that 
the strength of the visors in use should be investigated. They also said that when a deminer 
"requires treatment at a Thai hospital the staff there must be informed immediately.... that he 
is covered by insurance...... This will ensure that he receives the best treatment that the 
Hospital can offer". 
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 227 Name: Name removed 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: not known 
Compensation: not made available Time to hospital: not recorded 
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Protection issued: Long visor 
Short frontal vest 
Protection used: Short frontal vest, 
Long visor raised 
 







No medical report was made available. 
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a "Field control inadequacy" because it seems 
likely that the victim was either allowed to walk into an uncleared area, or a cleared area 
where a mine had been missed. It is possible that the area reduction and survey were poor 
and he entered a dangerous area unknowingly, which would be a higher management failing. 
The secondary cause is listed as a “Management/control inadequacy”.   
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